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In many vertebrate societies, forced eviction of group members is an impor-
tant determinant of population structure, but little is known about what
triggers eviction. Three main explanations are: (i) the reproductive compe-
tition hypothesis, (ii) the coercion of cooperation hypothesis, and (iii) the
adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis. The last hypothesis proposes that
dominant individuals use eviction as an adaptive strategy to propagate
copies of their alleles through a highly structured population. We tested
these hypotheses as explanations for eviction in cooperatively breeding
banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), using a 16-year dataset on life history,
behaviour and relatedness. In this species, groups of females, or mixed-sex
groups, are periodically evicted en masse. Our evidence suggests that repro-
ductive competition is the main ultimate trigger for eviction for both sexes.
We find little evidence that mass eviction is used to coerce helping, or as a
mechanism to force dispersal of relatives into the population. Eviction of
females changes the landscape of reproductive competition for remaining
males, which may explain why males are evicted alongside females. Our
results show that the consequences of resolving within-group conflict res-
onate through groups and populations to affect population structure, with
important implications for social evolution.1. Introduction
Individuals living in ‘viscous’ groups, in which there are severe constraints on
dispersal, face numerous conflicts of interest with other groupmembers. In coop-
erative breeders, conflict can arise over reproduction, helping effort, parental care
and dispersal [1–3]. Much theoretical and empirical work has focused on how
individuals resolve these within-group conflicts. In both insect and vertebrate
societies, individuals may use threats, aggression, punishment and various strat-
egies of negotiation to settle conflicts without breaking up the group [4–6].
In other cases, however, within-group conflict results in the forcible eviction of
one or more group members, typically following intense, targeted aggression
[7–10]. Eviction often leads to the permanent dispersal of individuals, or
coalitions of individuals, and may be a major source of gene flow between
groups [11,12]. Determining what triggers eviction is therefore important to
understand the factors that shape population genetic structure and demography
in viscous populations, and hence social evolution [13,14].
In social vertebrates, eviction often appears to be driven by conflict over
reproductive or social status within groups. In some mammal species, dominant
individuals maintain their reproductive monopoly by evicting reproductive
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Suricata suricatta, dominant females evict subordinate females
in the latter half of their (own) pregnancy, often as a strate-
gic measure to avoid infanticidal attacks on their pups [16].
Subordinates that are pregnant when evicted experience a
deterioration in condition, elevated stress levels, and often
spontaneously abort before gaining readmittance to their
group [7]. Consequently, eviction reduces future, as well as cur-
rent, reproductive competition from the perspective of the
dominant by suppressing subordinates’ future reproductive
success. In fishes that form size-based hierarchies, dominant
individuals use the threat of eviction to deter subordinates
from growing large enough to challenge their position
[17–19]. As a result, in the coral dwelling goby, Paragobiodon
xanthosomus, subordinates starve themselves to avoid triggering
eviction [20].
Alternative explanations for eviction are based on the idea
that dominant individuals can use eviction to coerce their sub-
ordinates to help. For example, the pay-to-stay hypothesis [21]
suggests that dominant individuals can threaten helpers with
eviction unless they behave cooperatively. Additionally, domi-
nant individuals might evict temporarily to coerce helpers
to work harder on their return [22], or evict permanently to
establish a reputation for punishment and thereby induce
remaining helpers to cooperate [23]. Clear evidence in support
of such coercive mechanisms comes from the cooperative
cichlid,Neolamprologus pulcher. Helpers that are experimentally
prevented from helping are subject to elevated aggression
from dominants and subsequently help more, as predicted if
aggression is a signal of impending eviction [9,24]. In addition,
helpers that are temporarily removed are often evicted on their
return, and those that are reacceptedwork harder thereafter [25].
In cooperative birds andmammals, evidence for the pay-to-stay
hypothesis is less clear-cut. In superb fairy-wrens, Malurus
cyaneus, temporary removal of helpers results in increased
aggression from dominants [26], while in naked mole-rats,
Heterocephalus glaber, and meerkats there is evidence that unco-
operative helpers are subject to aggression from dominant
breeders [27,28]. In addition, temporarily evicted female meer-
kats are more likely to allolactate on their return to the group
than non-evicted females [29]. By contrast, studies of bell
miners, Manorina melanophrys [30,31] and chestnut-crowned
babblers, Pomatostomus ruficep [32] have failed to find support
for mechanisms based on pay-to-stay or punishment.
A third, unexplored hypothesis is that eviction is an adaptive
forced dispersal strategy used by breeders to spread copies of
their alleles through thewider population. Traditionally, studies
of cooperative breeders have used the number of surviving off-
spring as a measure of fitness. However, groups of cooperative
breeders can be thought of as miniature populations embedded
within a wider metapopulation [33]. In this kind of structured
population, what matters is not just the number of offspring
that are successfully raised, but how successful these offspring
are at dispersing to form or join new groups, and in turn pro-
duce dispersing offspring of their own—sometimes referred to
as metapopulation fitness [34,35]. Forced dispersal could be a
strategy to maximize metapopulation fitness, over and above
any immediate benefits evictors might gain by reducing local
competition (although more intense local competition should
strengthen selection for forced dispersal). If eviction is primarily
a strategy to export copies of alleles, one would expect domi-
nants to evict related individuals rather than unrelated
individuals, to evict when local competition is high, and toevict when the evictees have the best chance of dispersing
successfully to found or usurp new groups.
Banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, are a good system to
test hypotheses about the causes and function of eviction in
cooperative societies because evictions are common and con-
spicuous. This species lives in mixed-sex groups of around
20 adults, plus offspring. Each eviction event starts suddenly,
lasts several days, and involves intense aggression from males
and females directed towards multiple individuals. Aggression
continues until groups of females, and on occasion groups of
males alongside them, are driven away from the group, some-
times limping or bleeding [8] (see the video of a typical
eviction event in the electronic supplementary material).
Up to 26 individuals have been observed to be evicted in a
single eviction event [8]. Evictees are sometimes allowed to
return to their group within a week (‘temporary evictions’) or
they may disperse permanently (‘permanent evictions’; [36]).
In mixed-sex, permanent eviction events, males and females
form same-sex cohorts and disperse separately, most likely to
avoid inbreeding [37].
In banded mongoose groups, there is intense reproductive
competition among both males and females [38]. Among
males, a few high-ranking ‘mate guarding’ males aggressively
monopolize access to females during oestrus: on average, the
oldest three males sire 85% of offspring in each group [39].
Most females give birth in each breeding attempt, usually on
the same day [40], and the communal litter is reared by the
whole group [41,42]. Pups compete for food and access to help-
ers, and the per capita reproductive success of females declines
as the number of breeding females grows large [15]. There is
also conspicuous helping behaviour exhibited by both parents
and non-parents. Both males and females ‘babysit’ offspring at
the den in the firstmonth after birth [41], and after pups emerge
they are guarded and provisioned by adult ‘escorts’ [43].
In this paper, we investigated what triggers eviction events
in groups of banded mongooses. We tested three distinct but
non-exclusive hypotheses: (i) eviction is a response to reproduc-
tive competition; (ii) eviction is used to coerce cooperation; and
(iii) eviction is an adaptive forced dispersal strategy. We make
the following predictions (table 1). First, if eviction is a response
to reproductive competition we predict that an eviction event is
more likely to occur when intrasexual competition is high, and
when ecological conditions are unfavourable for successful
reproduction. Other things being equal, increasing relatedness
should reduce the probability of an eviction event, because
dominants should be more tolerant of kin competitors [44],
and because kinship should reduce competitive effort within
groups [45,46]. Second, if eviction is used to coerce helpers we
predict a higher probability of eviction following breeding
attempts where helping performance was poor, where the out-
side options for helpers are good [47,48] and where relatedness
is low [49]. In addition, if eviction is used as a mechanism to
enforce harder work, we expect eviction events to result in
improved helping performance in the subsequent breeding
attempt. Third, if eviction is a means by which dominants
force copies of their alleles into the wider population we
expect eviction events to occur when relatedness in the group
is high, when local competition is high, and when ecological
conditions are favourable for successful dispersal.
We tested these predictions using a dataset of 496 breeding
attempts for which we had information on group composition,
reproductive success, helping behaviour, relatedness, ecologi-
cal conditions and whether eviction occurred. Note in this
Table 1. Predicted effects of social and environmental variables on the probability of eviction under the three hypotheses described in the text. (Numbered
references provide theoretical or empirical support for the predictions.)
hypothesis
number of
competitors
quality of
ecological
conditions
prior helping
performancea
change in helping
performancea
following eviction mean group relatedness
reproductive
competition
more same-sex
competitors
more intrasexual
competition
more evictions
poorer conditions
more intrasexual
competition
more evictions
no clear
prediction
no clear prediction lower relatedness
more intrasexual
competition [45,46]
more evictions
coercion of
cooperation
no clear prediction better conditions
groups less
stable [48], or
helpers work
less hard [47]
more evictions
poorer helping
performance
more
evictions
positive change
more evictions
lower relatedness
groups less stable [48],
or more
coercion required [49]
more evictions
adaptive
forced
dispersal
larger group size
more resource
competition
more evictions,
or
more same-sex
competitors
more
reproductive
competition
more evictions
better conditions
more
successful
dispersal
more evictions
no clear
prediction
no clear prediction higher relatedness
forced dispersal more
effective
more evictions
aMeasured by outcome or helping effort.
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eviction events, rather than on what features of individuals
determine the risk of being evicted.2. Material and methods
(a) Study population and data collection
We studied a population of banded mongooses on the Mweya
Peninsula, Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (08120 S, 278540
E), between October 1996 and February 2013. Details of habitat
are given elsewhere [38]. Daily measurements of temperature and
rainfall were recorded by the Uganda Institute of Ecology Meteoro-
logical Station and, later, using our own weather station. Over the
16-year study period, we observed 496 breeding attempts in 16
groups. Following [40], we defined a communal litter as one
where all pregnant females gave birthwithin 30days of one another.
Wedefined a breeding attempt as the 67dayperiodprior to thebirth
of each litter (comprised a 7 day oestrus and a 60 day gestation [50]).
We defined an eviction event to have occurred in a breeding attempt
if one ormore individuals left their group for at least 1 day following
a period of intense aggression towards themselves or other group
members [15,36]. In practice, evictions are conspicuous and noisy
events that are easy to recognize. Typically, individuals leave only
after being repeatedly attacked, but much aggression occurs in the
bushes where we are unable to identify the aggressors or their vic-
tims. Instances where individuals left their group without any
observed aggression towards any group member were defined asvoluntary dispersal events andwere not considered in our analysis.
Groups were visited every 1–3 days to record life-history and be-
havioural data. Most were habituated to human presence,
allowing observers to watch and follow them from less than 5 m.
One or two individuals in each group wore a radio collar (Sirtrack
Ltd., Havelock North, New Zealand) with a 20 cm whip antenna
(Biotrack Ltd., UK) that enabled groups to be located. Individuals
were easily identifiable by either colour-coded plastic collars or,
more recently, unique shave markings on their back. Individuals
were regularly trapped to maintain these identification markings
(see [51] for details). On first capture, a 2 mm skin sample was col-
lected from the end of the tail using sterilized scissors for genetic
analyses. DNAwas extracted and used to assign parentage and esti-
mate relatedness using a panel of 43 polymorphic microsatellite
markers (see [52] for further details).
(b) Statistical analyses
We used an information-theoretic approach [53] in which we
compared the explanatory power of models to investigate the
factors that predict the probability that:
(i) an eviction event occurred in a breeding attempt (‘female
evictions’). Since females are evicted in every eviction
event, we focused the analysis on the factors predicted
to influence female eviction;
(ii) when an eviction event occurred, males were evicted along-
side females (‘male evictions’). Herewe focused the analysis
on the factors predicted to influence male eviction; and
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than permanent (‘temporary evictions’). Since temporary
evictions could be either female only or mixed-sex
events, we included factors predicted to influence both
male and female eviction. An eviction was defined as
temporary if more than 50% of the evicted cohort were
allowed to return to their group.
For each analysis, we constructed a candidate set of models
which together provided a comprehensive test of the predictions
of our three hypotheses: reproductive competition, coercion of
cooperation and adaptive forced dispersal. The models incorpor-
ated additive combinations of the main terms predicted to
influence eviction probability for the hypotheses, together with
specific two-way interactions where we considered these to be
biologically relevant..B
283:20152607(i) Models of eviction as a response to reproductive competition
To test whether an eviction event is more likely to occur
when reproductive competition is high, we fitted the number of
reproductive competitors at the start of the breeding attempt
(denoted B), mean monthly rainfall (mm) (E) in the previous six
months, the interaction between these social and ecological vari-
ables (B : E), and mean group relatedness (R) as fixed effects.
Rainfall and insect abundance are correlated ([38,54], H. H.
Marshall 2013–2016, unpublished data) so we expect low rainfall
to intensify competition for food resources. In the female evictions
analysis, reproductive competitors were defined as females 10
months and over (10 months is the age at first conception;
[15,55]). In the male evictions analysis, reproductive competitors
were defined as males 3 years and over (3 years is the first age at
which males typically become regular mate guards; [37]). In the
temporary evictions analysis, male and female reproductive com-
petitors were defined as above and fitted as separate fixed effects.(ii) Models of eviction as coerced cooperation
The coercion of cooperation hypothesis predicts that eviction
should be triggered by poor helper performance, but it is not
clear whether animals should respond to the outcome of helping
(i.e. reproductive success), or to helping behaviour per se. We sep-
arately investigated these alternatives by using two indices of
helping performance: (i) female reproductive success (CS) and
(ii) helping effort (CE). We also examined the change in helping
performance (DCS or DCE).
(i) Female reproductive success, CS, was defined as the
number of emergent pups in the previous breeding attempt,
per female that contributed to the communal litter. To account
for differences in CS that could be explained by differences in
the amount of help available, we included the number of helpers
available to babysit that litter (H ) and the interaction between
these terms (CS :H ). The interaction term is necessary to capture
the difference between the same reproductive outcome achieved
with few helpers versus many helpers. We included mean group
relatedness (R) and mean monthly rainfall (E) as main effects. In
the female evictions analysis, we defined helpers as females aged
six months to 3 years, since females younger than 3 years are
classed as subordinate and are more likely to participate in help-
ing [43,56]. In the male evictions analysis, helpers were defined
as males aged six months to 3 years, since males do not
become consistent breeders until around 3 years of age and,
until then, contribute more to helping [37,57]. In the temporary
evictions analysis, male and female helpers were defined as
above and fitted as separate fixed effects.
To investigate whether eviction is used to coerce helpers to
work harder in the subsequent breeding attempt, we tested
whether the change in helping performance from one litter to
the next predicted the probability that an eviction event occurredin the interim. We reasoned that if eviction is used as a punish-
ment to improve future helping performance, an eviction event
(and temporary eviction events in particular) should be associ-
ated with an increase in helping performance of remaining or
returning helpers after eviction. We fitted DCS, DH and the inter-
action between them (DCS :DH ) as fixed effects, where DCS is
the change in female reproductive success (i.e. the number of
emergent pups, per female that contributed to the litter), and
DH is the change in the number of available helpers, across
two consecutive breeding attempts (the breeding attempt
before the eviction, and the subsequent breeding attempt).
Again, we included mean group relatedness (R) and mean
monthly rainfall (E) as fixed effects. Note that DCS and DH are
likely to be affected by the problem of regression to the mean
[58] because extremely high or low values in the first measure
of a given variable are more likely to move closer to the mean
in a second measure of that variable. We controlled for potential
problems with regression to the mean following the methods in
[58] (see the electronic supplementary material).
(ii) Helping effort, CE, was defined as the contribution by
helpers (H ) to babysitting in the previous breeding attempt
(i.e. CE ¼ number of helpers that babysat per day of babysitting).
We repeated the analyses outlined above, replacing CS with CE.
In the female evictions analysis, CE was defined as the number
of female babysitters aged six months to 3 years left per day of
babysitting of the previous litter. In the male evictions analysis,
CE was defined number of male babysitters aged six months to
3 years left per day of babysitting of the previous litter. In the
temporary evictions analysis, CE was defined as in the previous
two analyses and fitted as separate fixed effects. In the temporary
eviction analysis, the model including both the change in female
helpers’ babysitting effort and male helpers’ babysitting effort
was too complex to fit to the reduced sample of data and so
these variables were fitted in separate models. Since data on
babysitting behaviour was not available for all breeding
attempts, analysis using this helping effort measure of helping
performance was performed on a reduced sample (see the
electronic supplementary material, tables S2, S4 and S6).
(iii) Models of eviction as an adaptive forced dispersal strategy
To test whether an eviction event is more likely to occur
when relatedness is high, ecological conditions are good and
local competition is intense, we fitted mean group relatedness
(R), mean monthly rainfall (E), group size (all individuals aged
over six months) (G), the interaction between relatedness and rain-
fall (R : E), and the interaction between relatedness and group size
(R :G) as fixed effects. We included group size to allow for
the possibility that local resource competition contributes to the
timing of eviction events. The interaction between relatedness
and rainfall is particularly important to test the prediction that
high group relatedness in combination with favourable ecological
conditions will make an eviction event more likely to occur. The
definitions of R, E andGwere consistent across our three analyses.
An alternative prediction is that the nature of competition under
which adaptive forced dispersal operates could be reproductive,
rather than resource related. We fitted an identical set of models
to those described above, but replaced G with the number of
reproductive competitors (B) in each of the three analyses.
(iv) Comparing model performance
Models, including a null model containing no fixed effects, were
estimated using generalized linear mixed models (GLMM).
Group identification (ID) was included as a random intercept to
control for repeated measures across groups. In all analyses, we
used the maximum sample size for which we had data on all the
terms in all the models (electronic supplementary material,
tables S1–S6). In all three analyses, the eviction metric was fitted
Table 2. Female evictions. (Model performance in predicting the probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding attempt (N ¼ 415 breeding attempts
in 15 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance under the coercion of cooperation hypothesis. Models comprise
the top model set where DAIC  6. Hyp., hypothesis; A, adaptive forced dispersal; R, reproductive competition. Columns 2–8 show parameter effect sizes from
GLMMs on the logit scale: Int., Intercept; B, number of breeding females; E, mean rainfall in previous six months; R, mean group relatedness; symbol ‘:’,
interaction; k, number of estimated parameters including a random intercept for group ID; logLik, log-likelihood; AIC, Akaike’s information criterion; DAIC, change in
AIC value from the best performing model; wi, Akaike’s model weight; retained, ticks indicate that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of [62];
Adj. wi, adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.)
Hyp. Int. B E R B : E R : B R : E k logLik AIC DAIC wi retained Adj. wi
R 25.44 0.37 3 2108.63 223.26 0.00 0.34 3 1.00
A 23.34 0.11 214.46 1.76 5 2107.25 224.50 1.24 0.18
A/R 25.49 0.37 0.42 4 2108.62 225.25 1.99 0.13
R 25.45 0.37 0 4 2108.63 225.26 2.00 0.13
A 23.29 0.11 0 214.52 1.77 6 2107.25 226.50 3.24 0.07
A/R 25.51 0.37 0 0.43 5 2108.62 227.24 3.99 0.05
R 25.37 0.36 0 0 5 2108.63 227.26 4.00 0.05
A 23.34 0.11 0 214.11 1.77 20.01 7 2107.25 228.49 5.23 0.02
A 25.25 0.37 0 21.44 0.03 6 2108.60 229.21 5.95 0.02
R 25.42 0.36 0 0.44 0 6 2108.62 229.24 5.98 0.02
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lme4 package in R v. 3.1.2 [59,60]. We performed subsets selection
of the maximal model under each hypothesis using the ‘MuMIn’
package [61], which examines all possible combinations of terms
in each full model. Models were ranked by Akaike’s information
criteria (AIC), or corrected AIC (AICc) in analyses where N/k,
40, where N is the sample size and k is the number of parameters
in the maximal model [53]. We defined a ‘top model set’ as
models  D6 AIC (or AICc) units of the best supported model
[62], after excluding any models where a simpler nested version
attained stronger support (applying the ‘nesting rule’ of [62]). Full
model tables are provided in the electronic supplementarymaterial.0
no. breeding females
pr
ob
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 1. The probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding
attempt against the number of breeding females (N ¼ 415 breeding
attempts in 15 groups). The line shows model predictions (+s.e.).3. Results
(a) Observations of eviction
In total,we observed 47 eviction events in eight out of 16 groups
in our population between October 1996 and February 2013
resulting in the expulsion of 457 individuals. More females
than males were evicted; in the 46 events for which we knew
the sex and identities of the evictees, evictions resulted in the
expulsion of 274 females and 170 males, with the median
evicted cohort comprising 24% of the total group (range
3%–60%). Just three eviction events (6%) resulted in the eviction
of a single individual. In 25 (53%) of eviction events only
females were evicted, with a median of six females evicted in
a single event (range 1–12). On average, an eviction event
resulted in the expulsion of 40% of female group members
(range 6–79%). In the remaining 22 eviction events (47%), a
cohort of males was evicted alongside a cohort of females. In
these cases, the median number of evictees was 13 individuals
(range 6–26); median number of female evictees was six
(range 2–15) and median number of male evictees was nine
(range 1–17). On average, an eviction event resulted in the
expulsion of 35% of male group members (range 3–65%).
Males were only ever evicted alongside females. In eight out
of 22 mixed-sex evictions (36%), some or all of both sexes
dispersed permanently as a consequence of eviction. In allthese cases, the evicted cohorts of males and females split into
single-sex groups anddispersed separately. In 47%of all eviction
events, all evictees were eventually readmitted to their group
after persistently attempting to re-join. In 32%, some evicted
individuals (both males and females) were allowed to return
but others were not. Of temporarily evicted individuals, 69%
were readmitted to their group within one week, 97% within
one month and all individuals within six months of eviction.
(b) Testing the hypotheses
(i) Female evictions
Models of the reproductive competition hypothesis were by far
the best predictors of the probability of an eviction event occur-
ring during a breeding attempt (table 2). Specifically, it was the
model containing the number of breeding females that per-
formed the best out of the candidate model set, with an
eviction event more likely to occur when there were more
breeding females (figure 1). Models of the reproductive
Table 3. Male evictions. (Model performance in predicting the probability that males are evicted alongside females when an eviction event occurs (N ¼ 37 eviction
events in seven groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance under the coercion of cooperation hypothesis. Models
comprise the top model set where DAICc  6. Hyp., hypothesis; A, adaptive forced dispersal; R, reproductive competition; column headings as in table 2, with the
addition of B, number of breeding males; G ¼ group size; AICc, corrected Akaike’s information criterion; DAICc, change in AICc value from the best performing
model. Ticks indicate that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of [62]. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.)
Hyp. Int. B E R B : E R : B G k logLik AICc DAICc wi retained Adj. wi
R 22.28 0.38 3 220.42 47.57 0.00 0.51 3 0.95
R 21.81 0.39 20.01 4 220.32 49.88 2.32 0.16
A/R 22.16 0.38 20.68 4 220.41 50.07 2.51 0.15
R 20.30 20.10 20.04 0.01 5 219.78 51.51 3.94 0.07
A 20.94 0.11 29.71 2.02 5 220.24 52.41 4.85 0.05
A/R 21.64 0.39 20.01 20.90 5 220.31 52.55 4.98 0.04
A 23.82 21.58 0.15 4 222.08 53.41 5.84 0.03 3 0.05
0
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Figure 2. The probability that males are evicted alongside females when an
eviction event occurs (N ¼ 37 eviction events in seven groups). The line
shows model predictions (+s.e.).
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model weight of 100% of retained models from the top
model set when helping performance was measured in terms
of female reproductive success (CS) (table 2), and 95% when
helping performance was measured in terms of helping effort
(CE) (electronic supplementary material, table S2).
(ii) Male evictions
The probability that males were evicted with females, given
that an eviction occurred, was also best explained by the repro-
ductive competition hypothesis (analysis using the female
reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance).
Specifically, the model that performed best contained the
number of breeding males (table 3), with males more likely
to be evicted with females as the number of breeding males
increased (figure 2). The only other model to be retained after
applying the nesting rule [62] was the model of adaptive
forced dispersal containing group size and mean group relat-
edness, with males more likely to be evicted alongside
females in larger groups and when group relatedness was
low, although this model only attained an adjusted weight
of 5%. When performing the same analysis but using the
helping effort (CE) measure of helping performance on a
reduced sample size, the only model that was retained was
the null model which contained an intercept but no fixed
effects (electronic supplementary material, table S4).
(iii) Temporary evictions
None of our hypotheses explained whether eviction events
were temporary rather than permanent. The null model per-
formed better than all other models and this result was
consistent whether female reproductive success (CS) or help-
ing effort (CE) was used as a measure of helping performance
(electronic supplementary material, tables S5 and S6).4. Discussion
Previous work on eviction in this species highlighted repro-
ductive competition as a driver of female evictions, but did
not consider male or temporary evictions, or test alternative
hypotheses for eviction behaviour [8,15,36]. For both female
and mixed-sex eviction events, the reproductive competition
hypothesis best explained our data. Females were more likelyto be evicted when there were many breeding females in the
group. These female eviction events are likely to radically alter
the landscape of intrasexual competition among remaining
males, which may explain why groups of males are commonly
evicted alongside females. Males were more likely to be evicted
when therewere many breedingmales in the group, again sup-
porting the hypothesis that high levels of same-sex reproductive
competition is a trigger for mass eviction.
Sex differences in the intensity of reproductive competition
may explain why evictions of females are almost twice as
common as male evictions. Reproductive competition is par-
ticularly intense among female banded mongooses because
dominants are unable to suppress reproduction by younger
females and suffer substantial fitness costs when large num-
bers of subordinate females breed alongside them [15,56].
Dominant males, by contrast, can usually prevent subordinate
males from mating, and so are less sensitive to the presence of
additional males in the group. However, dominant males are
not immune from reproductive competition because they
cannot fully control the mating behaviour of females [39,50].
Dominant males might also evict (usually younger) subordi-
nates before these become genuine reproductive competitors,
similar to the explanations for eviction in size-based fish
hierarchies [17–20]. At the same time, young male banded
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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from putting up a fight to stay in their natal group compared
with females. This potential difference in the level of resistance
offered could explain why males sometimes disperse volunta-
rily, while female dispersal events almost always involve
intense aggression.
We found little evidence to support the idea that mass
evictions are triggered when it is adaptive for dominants to
force subordinates to disperse. We did find weak support
for a model which showed that males were more likely to
be evicted with females when groups were large, but when
mean group relatedness was low. This effect of relatedness
is the opposite of that predicted under the adaptive forced
dispersal hypothesis. Eviction of either sex was not more
likely when mean group relatedness was high, or when eco-
logical conditions were benign. We cannot rule out adaptive
forced dispersal entirely, however, because: (i) we currently
lack information about the long-term fate of evictees in the
wider population and (ii) we currently lack a formal model
of the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis which might pro-
vide discriminating predictions beyond those based on our
simple verbal arguments. Concerning point (i), eviction did
result in the permanent dispersal of 193 individuals, which
is 72% of the individuals in our population that left their
natal group [37]. Eviction is therefore likely to be a major deter-
minant of gene flow and population structure in this system.
Concerning (ii), demographic models of kin selection [13,63]
usually assume that dispersal is under the full control of the
offspring themselves, or under full maternal control (e.g. [64],
but see [65]). Our observations of eviction, by contrast, suggest
that in many real systems, no single party has full control over
group membership, and group dynamics are a compromise
between the interests of evictors and evictees. A model
embedding a conflict resolution mechanism (e.g. similar to
Higashi & Yamamura’s [44] insider–outsider conflict model)
in a demographic framework could be a useful tool to predict
population consequences of reproductive competition.
Finally, we found little evidence to support the coercion of
cooperation hypothesis for mass eviction in this system. This
contrasts with strong evidence that eviction, and the threat of
eviction, is used to coerce helpers to work harder in the coop-
erative cichlid N. pulcher [9,24,25,49,66]. Why should eviction
be effective to coerce cooperation in cichlids but not banded
mongooses? We suggest two reasons. First, theory suggests
that acts and threats of eviction will be much less effective at
coercing cooperation when targeted at a group of individuals
rather than specific individual helpers [15]. In a group of
helpers, the threat of mass eviction creates a tragedy-of-
the-commons over helping effort since the effort of any hard
working helper can be readily exploited by the idleness of
other potential evictees. Eviction is likely to be much moreeffective at inducing cooperation when targeted at individual
transgressors; for example, in dyads and in groups which exhi-
bit a strict rank hierarchy (such as cooperative cichlids;
[9,19,49]). Second, threats of eviction are predicted to be less
effective at inducing pre-emptive cooperation when evictees
are often reaccepted into the group, as in banded mongooses
([15]; this paper) and meerkats [16]. The best tests of the coer-
cion of cooperation hypothesis require experimental reduction
of helper effort [9,24], or manipulation of the availability of out-
side options [66,67], which is logistically challenging in birds
and mammals. Further innovative experimental tests in a
wider range of cooperative vertebrates would help to test the
coercion of cooperation hypothesis more rigorously.
To summarize, our results suggest that intrasexual repro-
ductive competition is the trigger for mass eviction of both
sexes from groups of banded mongooses. Eviction of females
appears to alter the landscape of intrasexual competition
among males, leading to the mass eviction of males at the
same time as, but separate from, the eviction of females.
We did not find evidence to link eviction events to the
enforcement of helping or the propagation of alleles through
a structured population. Nevertheless, our study highlights
that the consequences of resolving within-group reproductive
competition can scale up to affect population structure and
demography. This link betweenwithin-group conflict strategies
and population processes has been little studied theoretically
or empirically, but may be an important determinant of
life-history evolution in viscous animal societies.
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